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ILLICIT EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Daniëlla Dam* & James G. Stewart**

I. INTRODUCTION

Article 28A(1)(13) of the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(“The Protocol”) lists ‘Illicit exploitation of natural resources’ as a criminal offense within the Court’s
jurisdiction (hereafter “Illicit Exploitation”). The Protocol goes on to define Illicit Exploitation as
including seven different sub-offenses—sometimes vague, often groundbreaking—that might attract
criminal responsibility under the aegis of this new crime.1 The sole limiting criterion is whether acts
of illicit exploitation of natural resources are ‘of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state,
region or the Union’. In conjunction with the new mandate of the African Court, which includes the
exercise of jurisdiction over corporations for the first time in an international treaty, the prohibition
of “illicit exploitation of natural resources” creates an offense with especially sharp teeth, for
*

Assistant Professor, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. I wish to thank my
colleagues Dr. Mamadou Hébié and Dr. Sergey Vasiliev for their valuable comments during the drafting of this
chapter. Any remaining mistakes of course are my own.
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1
Article 28L Bis of the Protocol, entitled “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources”, reads:
‘For the purpose of this Statute, “Illicit exploitation of natural resources” means any of the
following acts if they are of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the
Union:
a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of
peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources;
b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in
violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned;
c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices;
d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly onesided;
e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned;
f) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the
protection of the environment and the security of the people and the staff; and
g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource
certification mechanism.’

businesspeople, their corporations, military actors and politicians. The crime constitutes an
important innovation in international law, since it offers a distinct legal basis for prosecution of a
wider array of acts covered by the war crime of pillage.2 Nonetheless, it also comes with a set of
major limitations, not the least of which is its great vagueness.
This chapter offers a critical doctrinal overview of the seven sub-offenses that fall within the
wider banner of this new crime of Illicit Exploitation, simultaneously pointing to a range of
interpretative possibilities that might accord with recent thinking about the relationship between law
and resource predation. We include a set of recurring shortcomings with the provision as drafted in
The Protocol even though we agree that accountability for resource predation in Africa is long
overdue. Our overall impression is that the provision is overly broad and insufficiently precise in
many manifestations of its form, but we hope that what follows functions as an introduction of sorts,
which other scholars will use as a point of departure for far more detailed scholarly treatment.
Accordingly, we divide this chapter into three parts. In Section 2, we situate the novel crime within
pre-existing avenues for regulating illegal exploitation of natural resources in international law. In
Section 2, we go on to examine the scope of the provision, focusing on its chapeau and the seven
different sub-offenses it covers. The chapter concludes in Section 4 with a brief overview of the
crime’s strengths and weaknesses.

II SITUATING THE NOVEL CRIME

Symbolically, the criminalization of illicit exploitation of natural resources is both significant and
timely. With the formulation of a novel international crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources,
the African community has taken an important step in addressing one of its major concerns in recent
decades. The illicit exploitation of natural resources is associated with the financing of armed
conflicts, which unsurprisingly, has very negative effects on local populations’ enjoyment of basic
human rights, physical security and economic wellbeing. Over the past decades, natural resources
have become one of the principal sources of revenue for armed groups, replacing Cold War
superpower sponsorship.3 In armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, the DR Congo and
the Central African Republic, natural resources did not necessarily provide the sole means or
motivations for armed violence, but they were at least one of several important causal factors that
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Pillage was also the legal basis for the International Court of Justice to hold the Ugandan State responsible for
the looting by Ugandan soldiers of the natural resources of the DR Congo. See International Court of Justice,
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19
December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para 245.
3
See K. Ballentine & J. Sherman (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance,
International Peace Academy (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003), at 1-3.
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helped sustain bloodshed. Thus, this new offense of illicit exploitation of natural resources
represents an important symbolic response to much publicized issues in a variety of African war
zones.
The problems that flow from the illegal exploitation of natural resources are by no means
limited to the funding of armed conflicts, however. An investigation led by various international
organisations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, concluded that around 98% of
net profits from illegal natural resource exploitation in the DRC - particularly gold, charcoal and
timber - goes to transnational organized criminal networks, while armed groups retain only 2% of
these profits.4 This blurring is typical of present day warfare, which is characterized by an important
interaction between the local and the global, and which resembles private enterprise more than
traditional ideologically motivated battles between military groups.5 Aside from organized crime,
illicit exploitation is also a key component in kleptocratic governance, a frequent part of endemic
corruption and illegal tax evasion,6 and a central driver of the famed resource curse, whereby the
richest countries in terms of natural resource endowment are, very counterintuitively, the poorest in
terms of standards of living.7 Thus, the illegal exploitation of natural resources is clearly a problem
with long historical antecedents and multiple negative impacts in contemporary Africa, thus
explaining the desire to criminalize the practice.
A range of complementary initiatives have demonstrated the same desire in recent years,
such that this new crime overlaps with a number of related areas of law. If these complementary
initiatives underscore the priority the international community attaches to the problem, especially in
Africa, they create an interesting and complex overlap with this new offense of “illicit exploitation of
natural resources.” In what follows, we flesh out several of these points of overlap in order to isolate
the added normative reach the new offense of Illicit Exploitation offers and to point out
opportunities for synergy with pre-existing regulatory initiatives. As we will see, the points of overlap
include a range of other criminal offenses that might attach to different aspects of resource
4

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources
benefitting organized criminal groups and recommendations on MONUSCO’s role in fostering stability and
th
peace in eastern DR Congo’, Final report, April 15 2015, available at www.unep.org (last visited 1 February
2016).
5
See on this e.g. M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford University Press,
Second Edition 2006); and W. Reno, ‘CSR and Corporate Engagement with Parties to Armed Conflict’, in C.
Walker-Said and J.D. Kelly, Corporate Social Responsibility?: Human Rights in the New Global Economy (The
University of Chicago Press Books 2015), at 259-277.
6
According to the Africa Progress Panel, Africa lost US$63.4 billion from illicit financial outflows between 2008
and 2010, of which US$38.4 billion was related to mispricing by multinational companies operating in Africa.
Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, Africa Progress Report
2013, Figure 22, at 66.
7
See R. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Routledge, 1993); M.L.
Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World Politics 51(2) (1999), at 297-322; and J.D. Sachs and
A.M. Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review 45 (2001), at 827-838.
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predation as well as a set of non-criminal schemes that attempt to regulate the same sorts of
behaviours.
With respect to overlapping criminal offenses, Illicit Exploitation partially overlaps with the
war crime of pillage.8 In the aftermath of the Second World War, a number of businesspeople were
prosecuted for pillaging natural resources during the war, principally because their exploitation was
“illegal” insofar as the true owners of manganese, coal, iron and oil never consented to their
appropriation. This exploitation was achieved through a range of different strategies and techniques,
but courts invariably concluded that these practices constituted pillage in war.9 Pillage appears to be
gaining traction as a legal response to the illegal exploitation of natural resources in modern resource
wars too. Swiss authorities conducted a formal investigation into one of the largest gold refineries in
the world for complicity in pillage a few years ago,10 and a Belgian businessman was arrested by the
Belgian authorities in 2015 for allegedly collaborating with former Liberian President Charles Taylor
and a rebel group in pillaging diamonds from Sierra Leone.11 Moreover, in September 2016, the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court formally published a new prosecutorial strategy, which
included a commitment to ‘give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are
committed by means of, or that result in… the illegal exploitation of natural resources.’12
States have also developed comparable criminal offenses through regional agreements to
tackle the illicit exploitation of natural resources, notably within the framework of the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).13 Most importantly, a specialized Protocol Against the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources was adopted in 2006 as part of the Pact on Security, Stability
and Development, which forms the basis for cooperation between the ICGLR Member States. This
8

For a more extensive analysis of this crime and its relevance for illegal natural resources exploitation, see J.G.
Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources (Open Society Justice Initiative
Publication 2011); and L.J. van den Herik and D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage:
The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation during
Armed Conflict’, Criminal Law Forum Vol.22(3) (2011), at 237-273.
9
See e.g. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. IX, the
Krupp case (Washington: Government Printing Office 1950), at 1344-1345; Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XIV, France v. Roechling (Washington:
Government Printing Office 1949), at 1113 and 1124.
10
The investigation was closed in 2015, because the Swiss prosecutor was unable to proof that the company
was aware of the criminal origin of the gold it refined, showing the difficulties in prosecuting companies further
up the supply chain. See J.G. Stewart, ‘The Argos Heraeus Decision on Corporate Pillage of Gold’, 19 October
2015, available through http://jamesgstewart.com/the-argor-heraeus-decision-on-corporate-pillage-of-gold/
(visited 27 September 2016) for a legal analysis of this decision and links to the prosecutor’s decision.
11
See https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/michel-desaedeleer/ (visited 8 December 2016). The suspect
died in custody on 28 September 2016.
12
Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, para. 41. https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=policy-paper-on-case-selection-and-prioritisation (visited 4 October 2016).
13
The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization established by the States located in the African Great Lakes
region to enhance regional cooperation in the fields of Peace and Security; Democracy and Good Governance;
Economic Development and Regional Integration; and Humanitarian and Social Issues. See http://www.icglr.org
for more information.
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Protocol aims to promote the development of effective mechanisms to address illegal exploitation of
natural resources, to enhance cooperation amongst the ICGLR Member States in this field and to
promote harmonization of their national legislations, policies and procedures.14 One of the most
important tools developed by the ICGLR for this purpose is a regional certification mechanism.15
From the perspective of criminal law, however, the most notable aspect of this parallel treaty regime
is contained in in Art 12 of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, which
also contemplates a novel set of domestic offenses governing what it calls “the illegal exploitation of
natural resources”.16
Of course, forms of “illegality” that might inform our understanding of “illicit” exploitation of
natural resources for the purposes of this new crime need not be limited to criminal law. It is
perfectly plausible that the new crime of Illict Exploitation represents the criminalization of a range
of regulatory schemes that were never meant to be punished through criminal law beforehand, and
on its face, The Protocol purports to do just this. At the global level, for instance, sanctions regimes
imposed by the UN Security Council seek to break the link between illegal trade in natural resources
on one hand and conflict financing on the other. The Security Council has imposed sanctions in a
number of instances, including diamond sanctions against Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia as well as
travel and financial sanctions against individuals and entities involved in illicit natural resources trade
in the Central African Republic and the DR Congo.17 In order to enhance the effectiveness of its

14

ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006, Art. 2.
See Article 11 of the Protocol, which was adopted in September 2014. See also www.icglr.org for the
certification manual (visited 29 March 2016).
16
Art 12 of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources reads as follows:
‘Each Member State shall ensure that all acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources are offenses under its
criminal law. Such acts shall include:
(a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of peoples’ sovereignty
over their natural resources;
(b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in violation of the legal
and regulatory procedures of the State concerned;
(c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices;
(d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided;
(e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned;
(f) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the protection of the
environment and the security of the people and the staff; and
(g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource certification
mechanism.’
17
For a more detailed discussion of these sanctions regimes, see D.A. Dam-de Jong, International Law and
Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (Cambridge University Press 2015); and
Security Council Report, ‘UN Sanctions: Natural Resources’, Research Report (2015) No 4,
www.securitycouncilreport.org (last visited 1 February 2016).
15
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sanctions, the Council has actively relied on several global and regional mechanisms that have been
created to address the problem of natural resources financing armed conflicts.18
Amongst these are informal mechanisms such as the 2002 certification scheme for rough
diamonds developed by the Kimberley Process (KPCS) to tackle the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’19 and
the 2010 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from ConflictAffected and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance) which assists companies in assessing the risks of their
mineral purchases to contribute to the commission of international crimes and gross human rights
abuses.20 In addition, the 2009 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created to
increase transparency and accountability in the extractive sector by publishing company payments to
governments. These are just some of the overlapping non-criminal initiatives that might help in
plotting the new crime’s significance across a wider set of regulatory initiatives, but at the same time,
these initiatives might be relevant in construing the term “illicit” within this novel offense itself. The
relationship between these overlapping criminal offenses, complementary regulatory initiatives and
the new crime announced within the Protocol is therefore a question that is complex, intriguing and
unexplored.
At the same time, this novel crime also raises a number of fundamental concerns, most
importantly relating to its scope and specificity. While the provision itself enumerates a limitative list
of seven acts that would fall under the crime, the definition of these acts is broad and open to
multiple interpretations. At times, there is uncertainty about which overlapping field the reference to
“illicit” exploitation appeals to, but other times interpretative difficulties stem from a failure to set
out the scope of the seven sub-offenses in terms that will come close to satisfying the demands of a
18

See D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘UN natural resources sanctions regimes : Incorporating market-based responses to
address market-driven problems’, in L.J. van den Herik (ed.), Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and
International Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
19
For the purposes of the KPCS, conflict diamonds have been defined as ‘rough diamonds used by rebel
movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in
relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar
UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in
future’. See KPCS Core Document, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document (
visited 17 March 2016).
20
The OECD Guidance was last revised in April 2016. Strictly speaking, the OECD Guidance is not a global
instrument, since it only applies to companies which are based in an OECD member State. Nevertheless, the
OECD Guidance has also been incorporated in the regional system of the International Conference for the
African Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), it has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and it has resulted in the
creation of similar guidelines in non-OECD member States, most importantly the guidelines developed by the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce. See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm (visited 30 May 2016);
the Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the
Great Lakes Region (2010), para. 12; UN Security Council Resolutions 1952 (2010), para. 8 and 2198, para. 22
on the DR Congo and Resolution 2153 (2014) on Côte d’Ivoire, para. 31; and China Chamber of Commerce of
Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers & Exporters, Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible
Mineral Supply Chains (2015), available at http://www.cccmc.org.cn/docs/201510/20151029133501092584.pdf (visited 17 March 2016).
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defensible criminal prohibition. In particular, these difficulties pose an inherent danger of overreach
and uncertainty that frequently risks compromising the foundational principle of nullum crimen sine
lege. In addition, the list omits particular acts that would logically fall under the definition of illicit
exploitation of natural resources, most particularly the exploitation of natural resources in
contravention of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. In what follows, we attempt to plot
these and other related concerns while elucidating the scope of the novel offense – as incorporated
in Article 28L Bis.

III. THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISION
Illicit Exploitation is potentially a very broad term. A wide variety of laws—both national and
international—govern different aspects of the resource extraction process. Given the absence of
official travaux préparatoires for The Protocol, our attempt to identify which norms the offense
contemplates is necessarily based on an interpretation of the provision itself within the context of
international law generally. In this light, one of the major strengths of Article 28L Bis is that it
includes a limitative list of acts that constitute ‘illicit exploitation´ for the purposes of the provision.
The definition is thus a welcome attempt to resolve some of the contests about the meaning of the
term “illegal” exploitation in other contexts,21 although as we suggest earlier, it still leaves a series of
very important questions unanswered. Before we address these intricacies, we pause to consider the
overarching chapeau elements that must be satisfied for each of the underlying sub-offenses.
Structurally speaking, the new crime is vaguely reminiscent of crimes against humanity: it contains an
overarching chapeau that operates as a kind of threshold triggering the application of the list of
seven sub-offenses that are enumerated beneath this threshold. The analysis that follows mimics this

21

Two of these attempts merit closer attention. Firstly, the UN Panel of Experts on the DR Congo, which had
been established by the Security Council to collect information on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in
the DR Congo and to analyze the links between natural resources and the continuation of the conflict, opted
for a very broad definition of illegal exploitation in its 2001 report. Its definition of ‘illegality’ hinged on the
following four factors related to the rule of law: a violation of sovereignty, specified as all activities that are
conducted ‘without the consent of the legitimate government’; conducting activities in violation of the existing
regulatory framework of the country of operation; activities that are contrary to widely accepted business
practices; and activities carried out in violation of international law, including soft law. The term ‘exploitation’
was similarly defined broadly so as to include ‘all activities that enable actors and stakeholders to engage in
business in first, secondary and tertiary sectors in relation to the natural resources and other forms of wealth
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. See Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 April 2001, UN Doc.
S/2001/357, p. 5. The second attempt has been made by the ICGLR for the purposes of its Protocol on Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources. Article 1 of the Protocol defines illegal exploitation as ‘any exploration,
development, acquisition, and disposition of natural resources that is contrary to law, custom, practice, or
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the provisions of this Protocol’. Illegal
exploitation as defined by the Panel of Experts and the ICGLR Protocol therefore includes a wide range of
aspects of the extraction process, while illegal also refers to a broad range of legal bases.
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structure, commencing with an analysis of the chapeau, then continuing to consider the various suboffenses one by one.
By way of preliminary observation, it is important to note that the provision does not
formulate distinct objective or subjective requirements for the chapeau itself or for the various suboffenses.22 One would normally refer to a general provisions concerning the mental elements of
crimes for the purposes of The Protocol or detailed definitions of the criminal offenses themselves,
but alas these are defined nowhere in the instrument. While The Protocol contains an explicit
provision on corporate criminal liability, which defines knowledge and intent in the corporate
context,23 a similar provision for individuals is lacking in the current draft of The Protocol.24 Similarly,
there is nothing in The Protocol approximating to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, which seek to
provide greater legal clarity to crimes that are broadly defined in the abstract within the ICC Statute
itself. To a large extent, the absence of these details undermines The Protocol’s creative attempt to
criminalize Illicit Exploitation and makes what follows somewhat speculative on our part, but we
hope that our preliminary analysis provides guidance that may be useful for scholarly debate, judicial
interpretation or legislative reform.

III.1 The Chapeau requirement of seriousness

To recall, the chapeau for the new crime stipulates that “illicit exploitation of natural resources”
means ‘any of the following acts if they are of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region
or the Union.’25 The chapeau requirement acts as a qualification for all of the seven underlying crimes
that make up the umbrella crime of Illicit Exploitation. In other words, the chapeau is an attempt at
limiting these offenses somehow, given the veritable sea of transactions (minor and grave) it would
capture without an initial threshold of this sort. Troublingly, though, the meaning of the terms
“serious nature” and “affecting the stability” remain entirely without further definition, requiring
that courts develop their own understandings in much the same ways as modern understandings of
crimes against humanity have emerged over the past decades. In what follows, we make a first
attempt at plotting several ways of interpreting the chapeau requirement in ways that balance the

22

See supra footnote 1 for the text of the provision.
See Article 46C of The Protocol, which stipulates that ‘[c]orporate intention to commit an offense may be
established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offense’,
where a ‘policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the
conduct of that corporation.’ Corporate knowledge on the other hand ‘may be established by proof that the
actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation […] even
though the relevant information is divided between corporate personnel.’
24
Article 46B on individual criminal responsibility does not set out clear mens rea requirements.
25
Emphasis added.
23
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desire for this offense to address the heart of the problem of Illict Exploitation without casting such a
broad net that the offense is unacceptably over-inclusive.
We take the terms “affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union” and “serious
nature” as implying separate tests, so deal with each in turn. With respect to the former, it strikes us
that a variety of different illicit resource transactions might “affect the stability of a state, region or
the Union” in different ways. Clearly, transactions that have an important impact on the advent or
maintenance of warfare affect stability in clear terms. The illicit harvesting of timber in Liberia’s civil
war as well as the exploitation of Congolese coltan at different points in “Africa’s First World War”
had this effect, and to employ an example from outside Africa, the illegal exploitation of Kuwaiti oil
by Iraq in 1991 was clearly a factor that affected the stability of the state and region. In each of these
scenarios, the transactions had negative impacts on stability in that they produced or sustained war.
We see no particular reason, however, to view stability as coterminous with warfare. The term
“stability” might possibility extend to other scenarios, where illicit resource transactions produce
political or health crises, major displacement, severe environmental damage or otherwise have
serious impacts on the safety of the general population. The difficulty is that without defining the
term “stability,” it is hard to discern whether any of these factors short of warfare will satisfy the
chapeau for the crime. We would therefore recommend to reflect upon the scope of the term
stability in light of the purpose of the provision. A broad understanding of this term may enhance the
possibilities for the Court to play a meaningful role in addressing acts of natural resources
exploitation that have serious repercusions for human beings or the environment outside situations
of armed conflict or generalized violence.
Unfortunately, the requirement that the illicit transaction be of a “serious nature” is not
markedly clearer either. The illicit trade in diamonds incontestability affected the stability of Angola
and the Great Lakes Region over several decades up until the early 1990s, so individuals who were
engaged in illicit transactions of a “serious nature” within the Angolan diamond trade might
conceivably be captured by the language in the chapeau.26 But which transactions are of a serious
nature? Here we see three options:
First, one might define “seriousness” is causal terms, eliminating actors who were making
overdetermined causes to the state of instability.27 If the defendant was one of very many low level
26

Although the parallel is not entirely direct, this interpretation of “a serious nature affecting the stability of a
state, region or the Union” operates in a manner similar to “a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population” in the chapeau of Crimes Against Humanity. A defendant him or herself need not personally play
an important role in the attack; his or her individual crimes must only be adequately connected to it. See ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Tadić, No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment of 7 May 1997, para. 649, referred to in C.K. Hall
and K. Ambos, ‘Article 7’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary (Hart, Third edition 2016), at 165-166.
27
James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189–1218 (2012).
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purchasers of illicit conflict diamonds in Angola, their contribution is less “serious” than that of actors
whose actions were causally necessary for the state of affairs. On this interpretation of seriousness,
this offense would be limited to politicians, military leaders, businesspeople and companies that
made an important difference to illicit resource markets that destabilized the political system. On
this reading, even those who exploited a great deal of illicit resources would not be captured by the
offense if they were fungible for a set of other actors who would have done similarly if they had not,
emulating the focus on “those most responsible” in other contexts.
Second, seriousness in this context could mean scale: an individual or corporation involved in
the extensive acquisition of illicit Angolan diamonds might undertake acts “of a serious nature
affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union.” This interpretation would exclude single, minor
and isolated acts of illicit exploitation, even if they did make some contribution to the terrible state
of instability in the region at the time, since these acts would in themselves not be sufficiently
serious. Of course, scale itself requires a threshold determination which is sometimes difficult to plot.
Does one tally up the entire quantum of diamonds exploited in Angola during the period, ascertain
the defendant’s relative contribution, and assert jurisdiction if that amount is more than five, ten or
twenty-five percent of the whole?
Third, one could interpret “serious nature” in symbolic terms. If a bank was directly involved
in the illicit exploitation of Angolan diamonds, and the role of banks in sustaining illicit resource
transactions had never been exposed in Angola or elsewhere, one might consider the responsibility
of bankers and their corporations as serious for symbolic reasons. This interpretation is broadest
because it would hold regardless of the quantity of the resources illegally acquired or the causal
significance of the bank’s contribution to the overall state of political stability the trade in diamonds
produced for Angola in our hypothetical. Therefore, this option provides prosecutors then courts
with considerable discretion.
We express no definitive preference for any one of these interpretative options, although
allowing the court an ability to pursue important symbolic cases might allow for a nuanced approach
to addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources provided some of the shortcomings with
this provision can be addressed.

III.2 Acts that constitute the international crime

This section analyses the seven sub-offenses included in Article 28L Bis, which are enumerated
beneath the chapeau requirement we have just addressed. Structurally, what counts as “Illicit” for
the purposes of Article 28L Bis results either from the conclusion of an agreement (sub-offenses a-d)
10

or from the actual exploitation itself (sub-offenses e-g). Interestingly however, the provision does not
define “natural resources” or “exploitation”, two concepts that are crucial to defining the scope of
the provision. For the purposes of this analysis, we propose to follow the definitions included in the
2006 Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, adopted by the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Arguably, these definitions are authoritative, since the text of
Article 28L Bis has been taken directly from Article 12 of this Protocol. The 2006 Protocol defines
“natural resources” as ‘substances provided by nature that are useful to human beings and have an
economic value […]. The major types of natural resources include minerals, flora and fauna, fishery
products and water’.28 Even though a focus on the economic value and utility of natural resources
would be restrictive in other contexts, this definition is appropriate for the purposes of Article 28L
Bis, which is exclusively concerned with acts of natural resources exploitation that have an economc
dimension. “Exploitation” for its part is defined as ‘any exploration, development, acquisition, and
disposition of natural resources’, thereby encompassing the whole array of activities from mining to
marketing.29 The extent to which this definition also encompasses acquisition of natural resources
further up the supply chain is not entirely clear, yet it is sufficiently open to accommodate forms of
indirect appropriation. We will now proceed to addressing each sub-offense in turn.

(a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of peoples’
sovereignty over their natural resources

The first sub-offense of illicit natural resources exploitation as included in Article 28L Bis refers to the
conclusion of an agreement to exploit natural resources ‘in violation of the principle of peoples’
sovereignty over their natural resources’. There are two issues that are important to note from the
outset. First, the scope of this provision, which is limited to concluding agreements, implies that the
relevant indices for the crime can be found in the terms of the agreement or the circumstances
surrounding its conclusion. Thus, the provision would not cover the exploitation of natural resources
in contravention of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources without an agreement, which
would be covered by other aspects of the offense.30 Second, the interpretation of the term “peoples”
is of crucial importance for the scope and addressees of the sub-offense. After all, the term

28

ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006, Art. 1.
Ibid.
30
These instances are covered by Article 28L Bis(e), which criminalizes the exploitation of natural resources
without any agreement with the State concerned.
29

11

“peoples” can refer either to the population of a State, to specific groups in a State or to the State
itself.31 This section addresses both these issues.
The principle of peoples’ sovereignty over natural resources can be traced back to the
General Assembly resolutions adopted in the 1950s and 1960s formulating a principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) as well as to Article 1(2) of the 1966 Human Rights
Covenants.32 However, the principal point of reference for the interpretation of peoples’ sovereignty
in Article 28L Bis of The Protocol would logically be Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which is subject to the jurisdiction of the African Court. This provision determines
that ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it’. Article
21 of the African Charter has proven to be very valuable for the protection of minority rights,33 but
has also been invoked by States in their relationship with other States.34 Therefore, the right of
peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources accrues both to States themselves and to groups
within a State. The ICGLR Protocol on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources defines this
relationship more clearly. Article 3 determines that ‘Member States shall freely dispose of their
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case, the
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populations of a State shall be deprived of it’.35 We here discuss some of the principal scenarios that
come within the reach of the sub-offense when it is construed in this manner.
First, the sub-offense would potentially cover agreements concluded between armed groups
and (foreign) companies that violate the State’s right to freely dispose of its natural resources. There
are numerous examples in the recent history of Africa concerning armed groups granting concessions
to companies to operate mines in territories under their control. For example, the Panel of Experts
on Angola revealed in a key report that before the imposition of the diamond sanctions on Angola in
1998, the opposition group UNITA had auctioned off mining permits to foreign companies for the
exploitation of mines within UNITA-controlled territory. In addition, the Panel found that UNITA had
granted various diamond buyers a licence to operate within the areas under its control in exchange
for a commission.36 If one considers the principle of sovereignty over natural resources as an
attribute of State sovereignty, granting an exclusive authority to the government to exploit natural
resources on behalf of the population, these activities would comfortably fit within the current suboffence. If, on the other hand, one adopts a more human rights oriented approach, the ultimate
question would be whether the armed group concerned, in this case UNITA, would be considered a
representative of the people.
Second, this sub-offense might also cover resource agreements concluded by foreign States
or their nationals over resource endowments. In the Armed Activities case before the International
Court of Justice, for instance, the DRC contended that Uganda had violated the DRC’s sovereignty
over its natural resources through illegal exploitation of these resources, including by allowing
Congolese rebel groups to trade with Ugandan businesses.37 Although the Court concluded that
permanent sovereignty over natural resources “is a principle of customary international law,” it also
found that there was nothing suggesting that this principle is “applicable to the specific situation of
looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural resources by members of the army of a State
militarily intervening in another State.”38 Nonetheless, as Judge Koroma cogently argued in a
separate opinion in that case, “these rights and interests [permanent sovereignty over natural
resources] remain in effect at all times, including during armed conflict and occupation.”39 Thus, the
factual allegations the ICJ addressed in the DRC v Uganda case might also satisfy this limb of the
offense of Illicit Exploitation.
35
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Third, agreements by state officials to the detriment of the State’s population might also fall
within the purview of the sub-offense. Africa has suffered several kleptocratic rulers who divert
natural resources revenues from the national budget for their own personal gain through strong man
politics and patronage networks.40 Relevant examples include Sese Seko Mobutu, the former
president of Zaïre, currently the DR Congo, and Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, who
were both accused of using the country’s natural resources for their own personal enrichment.41
These activities – at least in as far as they concern the underlying agreements concluded with
companies allowing for the diversion of revenues - would likely be captured by the novel crime of
illicit exploitation of natural resources as formulated in Article 28L Bis(a) of The Protocol,42 since the
“peoples” sovereignty over natural resources was violated by their political leaders. In this sense, the
offense is possibly a backdoor solution for the failure to criminalize kleptocracy itself.43
Fourth, the sub-offense might also be relevant to concession agreements that violate the
rights of indigenous peoples over land. Even though there is still considerable controversy about the
precise scope of the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands and the natural resources found
therein,44 there is growing recognition that these peoples’ special relationship with their lands
requires some form of protection, which would impact on States’ right to regulate natural resources
exploitation. The Ogoni case brought before the African Commission provides a relevant example.
The Commission considered in this case that the failure of the Nigerian government to regulate and
monitor the activities of private actors benefitting from concessions on the land inhabited by the
Ogoni people constituted a violation of the State’s obligation to act in the interest of the people
40
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when exercising its right to freely dispose of its natural resources, notably because of the detrimental
effects of the corporate activities on the livelihood of the people of Ogoniland.45 There is also a
growing body of case law by other human rights bodies dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples
over land in relation to concessions concluded by governments, indicating that there is an obligation
for States to consult indigenous peoples on natural resources projects.46
Notwithstanding these developments, the question can be raised whether the actual
conclusion of a concession agreement between the State and a (foreign) company violates the
sovereignty of indigenous peoples over their natural resources. Most of the relevant cases deal with
States’ obligations in relation to secondary rights, for example to obtain prior and informed consent
by indigenous peoples or, as in the Ogoni case, to regulate the environmental and social aspects of
natural resources exploitation. In addition, whether violations of the rights of indigenous peoples
would reach the threshold established in the chapeau is debatable. Arguably, instances in which
agreements affecting the rights of indigenous peoples would have an actual or potential impact on
the stability of the State itself would be exceptional. For these reasons, it is uncertain if and to what
extent the sub-offense would cover agreements concluded by the State to the detriment of
indigenous peoples.

(b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in violation of the
legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned

The second sub-offense of “illicit exploitation of natural resources” aims to criminalize the conclusion
of contracts with state officials in violation of procedures set out in relevant national legislation.
Some may argue that this provision is unduly onerous. Whether one should hold an investor
criminally responsible for concluding an agreement contrary to domestic law, when this agreement is
concluded with state authorities as the guardians of their own laws and regulations is disputable.
This concern is all the more valid if one considers that the provision is formulated broadly. It refers
generally to domestic ‘legal and regulatory procedures’. Does this mean that any violation of these
procedures would be criminal for the purposes of this provision? Or would the provision only apply
to laws and regulations that aim to protect important values of the host State? In addition, should
45
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the African Court be allowed to scrutinize the policies of sovereign States, which may have good
reasons to exempt a project from its regulatory procedures? Notwithstanding the fact that the
chapeau can play an important role in limiting the instances to which the sub-offense applies, there
is a need to define the elements of the current sub-offense more clearly. Current case law by
international investment tribunals regarding the legality of investments may be a helpful reference in
this regard, 47 but mostly the issue is one that warrants far greater thought. The principal question
would be what type of acts the provision aims to target: would it be confined to situations where
investors collude with State authorities acting ultra vires or would it also encompass other
situations? In the following, two examples will be provided to demonstrate the types of situations
that are potentially covered by the sub-offence.
A Nigerian case provides a first relevant example. This case involved a contract concluded by
Shell and Eni with the Nigerian government to exploit a major oil field off the coast of Nigeria. The
Nigerian government allegedly acted as a middle-man for the Nigerian company Malabu, said to be
owned by the former oil minister Dan Etete.48 After the conclusion of the deal, the money was
allegedly transferred to Malabu and diverted to Etete’s personal bank account.49 In 2014, the
Nigerian House of Representatives called on the Nigerian government to cancel the deal, describing
it as ‘contrary to the laws of Nigeria’.50 If Shell and Eni knew that the Nigerian government acted only
as a middle-man,51 this incident could arguably come within the purview of the current sub-offense,
although we reiterate the complexities of discerning whether particular transactions meet the
chapeau threshold and again highlight the absence of any indications about the requisite mental
elements for these crimes.
Liberia offers a slight variation of the same offense. A 2013 audit report commissioned by the
staff of the Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) to investigate 68 contracts
concluded by the Liberian authorities between 2009 and 2011 determined that 90% of these
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contracts violated the provisions of relevant mining and forestry laws.52 Although it is not entirely
clear whether the Liberian cases would in themselves meet the threshold set by the chapeau of Art.
28LBis, it is important to consider these in light of Liberia’s recent history. It was only a decade ago
that major scandals in the Liberian mining sector were considered to constitute such a threat to the
Liberian peace process that international donors initiated an intrusive yet fairly successful
programme, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), to
improve public administration, focusing inter alia on concession procedures.53 With the caveats we
mention throughout, these too might violate this limb of the new offense enshrined within The
Protocol.

(c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices

This sub-offense seeks to criminalize a widespread phenomenon, which severely diminishes the
chances that African peoples will benefit from their natural resource endowments. Corruption can
take several forms in relation to natural resources. In addition to the diversion of revenues obtained
from exploration and exploitation contracts, another commonly used method is the undervaluation
of public natural resources deposits. The 2013 Africa Progress Report concluded, for example, that
assets in the mining industry in the DR Congo were sold on average at one-sixth of their estimated
value.54 Even though the Panel focused on the undervaluation itself and did not investigate
allegations of corruption, it did signal that corruption would be one of the factors explaining the
undervaluation.55 Significantly, this sub-offense would criminalize corruption in these circumstances,
again under the umbrella of Illicit Exploitation.
For definitional purposes, the current sub-offense should be read in conjunction with Article
28I of The Protocol, which criminalizes acts of corruption ‘if they are of a serious nature affecting the
stability of a state, region or the Union’. The term ‘corruption’ in Article 28I is defined so as to include
inter alia the offering or acceptance of financial benefits or other advantages, by or to public officials,
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persons directing or working for private entities or other persons in a position to exert improper
influence on the decision-making process, whether for their own advantage or for the advantage of
third persons. The provision covers acts of bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment and
concealment. It thereby largely follows the principal categories of corruption established in the 2004
UN Convention Against Corruption and complements its provisions on domestic criminalization.56
Borrowing this provision from elsewhere in The Protocol is therefore very appropriate in interpreting
this limb of Illicit Expropriation.
If this reading is accurate, however, this third limb of the definition of illicit exploitation of
natural resources is somewhat duplicative of acts criminalized elsewhere in The Protocol. In other
words, what would be the added value of including a separate sub-offense under the heading ‘illicit
exploitation of natural resources’ allowing for the prosecution of corrupt practices as a means to
conclude an agreement to exploit natural resources if these corrupt practices can also be prosecuted
as acts of corruption in their own right? From this perspective, the inclusion of the current suboffense in The Protocol predominantly has symbolic value, in the sense that it emphasizes that all
forms of financial or other incentives used to persuade a person in a position of power to conclude a
contract are criminal.

(d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided

This sub-offense is worded very vaguely and can only be properly understood with reference to the
French authentic version of the text, which criminalizes ‘la conclusion par fraude ou par tromperie
d’un contrat d’exploitation des ressources naturelles’.57 According to the French text, the sub-offense
would apply to the conclusion of contracts by means of fraud or deception. We recommend
following this definition, since it is much more precise than the reference to agreements that are
‘clearly one-sided’ in the English text. Upon this reading of the text, the current sub-offense would
apply to cases of intention to deceive (state) authorities or business partners when negotiating
contracts. This can relate, for example, to misrepresentation by the investor of its financial
capabilities or concealment of the company’s true ownership (shell companies), provided of course
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that these forms of misrepresentation are of such a serious nature as to actually or potentially affect
national stability. State officials may also be liable for the offense if they undertake similar practices.
Other examples would relate to tax avoidance schemes that would deprive the host state of
substantial tax revenues.58 One way is the deliberate mispricing of assets in cross-border intracompany transactions.59 This practice can be avoided through the inclusion of express provisions in
investment contracts concluded between the host State and the investor stipulating that transfer
pricing should be based on the arm’s length principle, i.e. that it should reflect actual market value.60
Arguably, the prosecution of these practices would send a strong signal to companies that they
should refrain from creating loopholes in the system that produce grossly inequitable agreements in
developing countries. Nevertheless, whether this issue fits squarely within the ambit of this particular
offense is a question that courts and scholars will have to address in greater depth in the future.

(e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned

Read in conjunction with the chapeau, this limb is by far the most appropriate aspect of Illicit
Exploitation for addressing the trade in ‘conflict resources.’ The practice is often dependent on
military and political elites who arrange the exploitation and benefit from its proceeds. In addition,
businesspeople and corporations often play an important role in perpetuating these practices, either
by procuring natural resources from armed groups or by exploiting natural resources under the
control of armed groups.61 Article 28L Bis(e) could therefore provide a legal basis for prosecuting
those involved in the exploitation of conflict resources, whether this concerns senior members of
armed groups, corporations or their representatives.
However, there are important reasons to reconsider the formulation of this limb, since it
seems to portray the State as the only authority entitled to alienate natural resources. We
recommend interpreting the reference to ‘agreement with the State’ as requiring permission from an
entity which has the authority to dispose of the natural resources concerned. There are two
important reasons for opting for this interpretation. First, an exclusive focus on the State as the only
58

See for examples Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, Natural Resource Contracts: A Practical Guide,
November 2013, available online at
https://www.elaw.org/system/files/Natural_Resource_Contracts_Guide.pdf (visited on 26 May 2016), at 29-33.
59
Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, Africa Progress
Report 2013, at 65. See also the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations 2010 (OECD Publishing 2010), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2010-en.
60
See Ibid.
61
For examples of corporate involvement in the exploitation of conflict resources, see e.g. the Report of the
Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, UN Doc. S/2000/203, 10 March
2000, paras. 78, 79, 87-93; the Final Report of the Monitoring Group on Angola, UN Doc. S/2000/1225, in
particular, paras. 154-161; and the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, December 2000.

19

authority entitled to conclude agreements over the exploitation of natural resources would have the
effect of criminalizing companies for doing business with private concessionaires or mine owners
possessing a valid legal title. Title in natural resources is regulated differently from one jurisdiction to
the next.62 Even in instances where States are the owners of natural resources within their territory,
they are perfectly capable of passing this title on to private owners. Clearly, the drafters of this
provision never meant to criminalize cases where a businessperson, for instance, purchases natural
resources from a company that enjoyed title in those resources, even though this is what the
language of the provision literally suggests.
In addition, especially in the midst of a full-blown internal armed conflict, it is not always
clear which entity is entitled to formally represent the State and therefore has the right to dispose of
its natural resources. Even though there is a presumption in international law in favor of the
incumbent government,63 there may be circumstances in which other entities have competing or
even better claims. Arguably, a right to exploit natural resources can accrue to armed groups who are
in effective control of parts of the State territory, as long as the revenues obtained from the
exploitation of natural resources are used for the benefit of the local population.64 By contrast, there
may be circumstances in which the incumbent government can no longer be deemed to be entitled
to dispose of the State’s natural resources. To illustrate, the UN Security Council imposed an asset
freeze on the Libyan authorities in 2011, including on Libya’s national oil company as a ‘potential
source of funding for [Gaddafi’s] regime’.65 In light of these shortcomings, we recommend amending
the provision by replacing “States” with “owners” or for courts to interpret the provision in this
fashion.
62
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(f) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the protection of the
environment and the security of the people and the staff

This sixth sub-offense is a significant departure from the preceding sub-offenses, in the sense that it
is directly concerned with the protection of values other than those related to ownership. Whereas
earlier aspects of Illicit Exploitation approximated it to theft, this sub-offense instead focuses on the
effects of resource exploitation on the environment and human beings. A strict reading of the
provision would confine the sub-offense to instances that satisfy both elements: the release of toxic
substances, for example, will harm the environment and will also affect the security of the people
and the staff. There are, however, also instances where either the environment is harmed or the
security of the people and/or the staff are endangered. We presume that these instances are also
covered by the sub-offense, notwithstanding the use of the word ‘and’ in The Protocol.
The first issue that this limb may address is large-scale environmental pollution caused by the
mining industry, provided this would affect the stability of the State. In this sense, it also aligns with
current discussions regarding the introduction of environmental crimes in international criminal
law.66 Environmental pollution would particularly affect the stability of the State if it would harm
vulnerable communities, who are dependent on the environment for their livelihood, or when the
pollution would cause serious diseases amongst the population, as these effects would enhance
grievances amongst the population and thereby affect stability negatively. One of the most wellknown examples reaching this threshold is the environmental pollution caused by oil spills in the
Nigerian Niger delta, which have seriously contaminated the fragile wetlands and their rich
biodiversity, depriving the local population of its basic means of subsistence and exposing them to
major health risks.67 Importantly, this pollution also had serious repercussions for the security in the
Niger delta.68
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The provision may also address concerns arising from security measures to protect the
operations of extractive companies, especially when these operations are carried out in conflictprone or conflict-torn regions. Mining companies often use security forces to protect their interests,
including State forces and private security firms. Sometimes clashes occur between those security
firms and the local population, especially in reaction to popular protests against the company’s
operations. By way of example, clashes allegedly occurred in Tanzania in 2011, when local villagers
tried to enter a gold mine operated by a British company in protest to their operations. The security
forces were accused of having used excessive violence against the population, including killings,
severe beatings and rape. The subsequent lawsuit filed by the villagers in the UK court was settled
out of court in early 2015.69 In addition to incidents involving local communities, companies have also
been accused of using excessive force against their own staff, sometimes in cooperation with local or
State authorities. A well-known example is the incident at the Marikana platinum mine in South
Africa in August 2002, when 34 workers who were striking to improve their working conditions were
allegedly killed by the police.70 This incident led to a series of strikes throughout the country,
potentially bringing the “Marikana massacre” within the ambit of the chapeau. These are just some
examples of violence used by companies or State authorities against local communities and staff,
which could be addressed by the current provision, provided one adheres to a broader reading of the
sub-offense.
Lastly, the sub-offense could cover serious violations of fundamental safety and health
norms, such as exposing employees to dangerous substances or exploiting natural resources without
taking any precautions to prevent serious accidents, such as explosions. Here again, it is unclear what
violations of these norms would reach the threshold set by the chapeau. Would the explosion of a
single mine affect the stability of a State, if it is symptomatic of a broader pattern of violation of
safety standards? To draw on a famous example from outside both the resource sector and Africa, in
1997, the accounting firm Ernst & Young completed an audit of a shoe manufacturing plant in
Vietnam for Nike. The report indicated that “there is no adequate water reserved for comfort use of
workers”, dust and toxic fumes in parts of the plant “exceeded the standard from 6 to 177 times,”
and “there are 128 employees (77.57%) getting respiratory disease and 7 employees (4.24%) getting
heart disease.”71 With the caveats about the chapeau requirement and the need to prove mental
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elements that are not defined in The Protocol, a repetition of similar practices in the resource sector
in Africa might violate this limb of The Protocol’s definition of Illicit Exploitation.
A final issue that needs to be clarified relates to the term ‘norms’. The reference to ‘norms’ in
the provision is open-ended and begs the question of what types of norms would be covered. Would
these include soft law norms, such as ILO standards, ISO standards for environmental protection, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights? Since the provision addresses the responsibility of private companies in addition to state
actors, it may be assumed that norms and standards developed by non-binding instruments and
national law would be the principal benchmarks against which to assess the legality of their behavior.
This does not have to be problematic from the perspective of legal certainty, as long as these
instruments provide sufficiently detailed guidance to companies against which to assess their
behavior. However, on a more fundamental level, one may wonder if it is appropriate to elevate socalled ‘voluntary’ instruments to the level of binding norms by criminalizing the breach of their
provisions.

(g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource certification
mechanism

This limb of the Illicit Exploitation offense criminalizes the violation of norms and standards set by
natural resources certification mechanisms. Currently, there are two important resource certification
mechanisms in place in Africa. These are the Kimberley Process Scheme for the Certification of Rough
Diamonds (KPCS) and the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism for tin, tantalum, tungsten and
gold (3TG). We briefly consider both of these certification schemes, highlighting the very significant
implications that arise from the quick criminalization of regulatory regimes that were sometimes
created for states, frequently intended as soft law, and seldom given the sort of precision that might
ground criminal liability.
The KPCS requires States to adopt a system of internal controls designed to eliminate conflict
diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into or exported from their territory.72 For
this purpose, participants must designate Importing and Exporting Authorities, ensure that rough
diamonds are imported and exported in tamper-proof containers, adopt appropriate legislation to
implement and enforce the Certification Scheme, and collect, maintain and exchange official
production, import and export data with other participants.73 The KPCS constitutes soft law,
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formulating non-binding ‘minimum requirements’ for States to implement in their domestic systems.
The sudden criminalization of violations of this scheme raises a series of important questions: (a)
which aspects of the KPCS fall within the scope of the crime; (b) can non-state actors also violate the
‘norms and standards’ of the KPCS for the purpose of Article 28L Bis(g) of The Protocol even though
the the scheme addresses States exclusively; 74 and (c) have states fully understood that the ways in
which violations of the KPCS were just transformed into supranational crimes?
The certification mechanism developed by the ICGLR is the second important regulatory
scheme. This mechanism introduces a system of controls aimed at guaranteeing that minerals
exported from the ICGLR are conflict-free.75 The system encompasses certification for mines to attest
that they are conflict-free and meet certain minimum social standards.76 In addition, it introduces a
chain of custody tracking system for minerals to prevent any sort of support to armed groups
throughout the supply chain to the point of export and, lastly, it comprises the certification of
mineral exports. This process is monitored by government officials and third party audits, while
regional databases for the designated minerals seek to bring greater transparency in the mineral
flows.77 Contrary to the KPCS, the ICGRL certification mechanism does contain direct obligations for
private actors, such as processors, comptoirs, smelters and other exporting entities, the latter
defined as a ‘company, cooperative, individual or other entity that exports Designated Minerals from
a Member State’.78 Relevant obligations include an obligation to refrain from purchasing minerals
from uncertified mines and an obligation to ensure that other actors upstream in the supply chain,
i.e. those actors from which the minerals are purchased, act in compliance with the relevant
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standards set by the mechanism.79 Since these obligations are numerous, sometimes procedural and
not explicitly specified, we believe that this sub-offense is overly broad and requires clarification.
More generally, it is questionable whether the violation of ‘norms and standards’ that are
part of soft law should be recognized as an international crime at all. Even as far as these norms and
standards have been included in domestic legislation, the transformation of these non-criminal
“norms and standards” into a supranational criminal offense may strike some as controversial if not
harsh. The problem with the norms and standards included in certification mechanisms is that, apart
from having been drafted as best practices in the industry rather than criminal offenses, they are
continually subject to change. Both shortcomings are problematic from the perspective of providing
the legal certainty required for a serious criminal offense. Thus, reformulating this sub-offense as a
separate crime, moving away from “norms and standards”, and focusing on the issue of due diligence
obligations for companies may better delimit this offense. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas can be a useful
tool in this respect, since it provides a clear five-step framework for companies to exercise due
diligence. Even here, though, it would be highly advisable to translate these broad policies into terms
typical for criminal offenses, including by stipulating the crime’s objective and subjective elements
explicitly.

IV CONCLUSION
The crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources, as included in The Protocol, is highly innovative.
It provides new opportunities to address grave injustices related to the exploitation of natural
resources as well as to bolster the abilities of African States to use their natural resource wealth for
the benefit of their respective peoples. At the same time, the provision as currently formulated is
unsatisfactory in several dimensions. In some regards, the crime over-criminalizes a whole raft of
regulatory regimes no one previously thought gave rise to criminal responsibility. In other instances,
a strict reading of the Protocol would result in the criminalization of perfectly legal acts. Elsewhere,
there is the problem of overlap, both within the provision and in relation to other provisions included
in The Protocol. Overall, the absence of any mention of objective or subjective elements capable of
proving the offense transgress basic principles in the criminal law. The shortcomings that we have
identified in this chapter point to a need to further refine both the scope of the provision as well as
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its intention We recommend the drafting of elements of crimes as a way to resolve some of the
difficulties we point to. The reality of resource predation, especially in Africa, is a subject of major
concern that has justifiably attracted considerable attention. The criminal law should certainly play a
role in responding to this morose reality; indeed, much of our work stems from the view that
accountability in this realm is long overdue, and that in some instances, it is difficult to imagine long
term stability in regions without a robust concept of title in natural resources and powerful
regulatory regimes to enforce violations of this title. Nevertheless, the foregoing suggests that the
criminal law should serve a very principled role in addressing the problem that conforms with a very
orthodox understanding of fair punishment.
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